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The case of the all-black 25
th
 Infantry of the United States Army in the Brownsville Affair 
is perhaps one of the most egregious events in American history. On the night of August 13, 
1906, a group of anonymous men went on a shooting rampage throughout the town of 
Brownsville, Texas, leaving one person dead and another wounded. Since there had been 
hostilities between black soldiers and white civilians prior to the shootings, it did not take long 
for local authorities to assume the collective guilt of black soldiers. Without an adequate 
investigation or a full hearing, President Roosevelt bowed to public pressure issued dishonorable 
discharges to all members of the 25
th
 who were stationed in Brownsville. Following their 
immediate discharge from the United States Army in December 1906, many of these soldiers 
were refused civilian employment due to their military status. This thesis is a reexamination of 
the Brownsville affair and its aftermath and seeks to make a case for restitution on behalf of the 
discharge soldiers and their families.   
V
Introduction  
The city of Brownsville, Texas, became the center of a national controversy on the night 
of August 13, 1906, when members of the all-black 25
th
 Infantry of the United States Army were 
accused of shooting up the town and killing a white civilian. Since there had been hostilities 
between the locals and the black soldiers since the 25
th
’s arrival weeks earlier, it did not take long 
for whites to assume the collective guilt of black soldiers, although there was no evidence to 
suggest that black soldiers committed the shootings. Although there had been a long history of 
conflict between black soldiers and white civilians in the American South, this case was 
exceptional in that President Theodore Roosevelt issued dishonorable discharges to all 167 
members of Companies B, C, and D, of the 25
th
. Roosevelt issued the discharge to the soldiers 
although they were not given a hearing nor did they have an opportunity to defend themselves 
against the charges. Fourteen of the soldiers did receive honorable discharges in 1910, and the 
remainder of the men received honorable discharges in 1972. This thesis revisits the Brownsville 
affair and pays close attention to the injustice perpetrated on members of the 25
th
 Infantry and 
concludes by making a case for reparations.  
On the night of the shootings a group of fifteen to twenty armed men ran throughout the 
commercial and business areas of Brownsville firing at civilians, residences, and businesses. The 
first house they fired upon was the home of Louis Cowen, a home he and his wife shared with 
their five young children. Minutes later Frank Natus, a local bartender, became the affair’s only 
fatality after he was shot in the forehead by a member of the unnamed mob.  
Police Lt. Ygnacio “Joe” Dominguez was on duty that particular night but was not 
accompanied by his usual eight man-patrol:  
 
1 
Genaro Padron, Dioniso Lerma, Rafael Galvan, Vidal Rivas, Jose Coronado, Felix Calderon, 
Macedonio Ramirez and Cesario Leal.  
Because of the city’s vibrant red-light district that catered to Mexicans and Black 
soldiers, the Brownsville police often needed more officers at night than in the day. Nonetheless, 
Dominguez was by himself on this fateful evening. Dominguez was sitting on the steps of the 
local markethouse when he first heard the Winchester shots coming from the garrison wall of Fort 
Brown.1
 
Alarmed, Dominguez jumped on his horse and sped down Washington Street before 
turning onto Thirteenth Street. As he approached the Miller Hotel across from Cowen Alley he 
saw eight straggling soldiers running toward Fort Brown. As Dominguez crossed onto Thirteenth 
Street towards Elizabeth Street, he hollered for the guests at the Miller Hotel to put out their room 
lanterns.2 After a number of warnings, Dominguez continued down Thirteenth Street with his 
back to the raiders. As he turned north, the raiders took numerous shots, and his horse fell from 
underneath him breaking his left arm. Dominguez struggled to free his legs from beneath the 
horse. Soon thereafter, he miraculously walked on Elizabeth Street and crawled as far as Twelfth 
Street, where he met two Mexicans and lost consciousness.3
 
Once the shooting concluded, Mayor Combe of Brownsville walked down Elizabeth 
Street toward the garrison wall of Fort Brown. As he surveyed the town, police chief George 




                                                 
1 John D. Weaver, The Brownsville Raid (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1971) , 48. 
2 Ibid, 50. 




Combe was told that four police officers were missing, and Lt. Dominguez was reportedly 
dead. The mayor continued down Elizabeth Street where he encountered Dominguez’s horse as it 
lie dead on the sidewalk.4
 
At the post office, a group of angry men gathered with their rifles, 
wanting revenge, until the mayor approached and convinced them that he would ask Major 
Penrose to investigate the shooting. Company D commander, Captain Samuel P. Lyon testified 
during the Senate Hearings Committee that the people were quiet then, and Mayor Combe 
relayed to him that he had succeeded in dispersing a band of 200 armed men that were headed to 
Fort Brown.5
 
At Fort Brown, Major Penrose ordered his men of every company to defensively 
line up alongside the garrison wall fearing that the townspeople were attacking them. After the 
shooting, Penrose detached a group of soldiers to investigate. Upon their return with Mayor 
Combe, Penrose realized that the soldiers were considered suspects by the townspeople. During 
the morning of August 14, 1906, Combe appointed a committee of four who were to appoint a 
committee to investigate the raid. Out of the four men appointed by the mayor, three, Captain 
William Kelley, Major John B. Armstrong, and E. H. Goodrich were ex-Union officers of the 
Civil War. William Ratcliff, a director of the First National Bank and president of Brownsville 
Land and Irrigation Company rounded out the search committee. Within hours, the Citizens 
Committee appointed Sheriff Celedonio Garza, Chief of Police George Conner, County Judge 
John Bartlett, Brownsville Attorney Frank W. Kibbe, Alderman James A. Brown, ex-Union 
Officer E. H. Goodrich, Brownsville Daily Herald Editor Jesse O. Wheeler, Banker John G. 
Fernandez, William Ratcliff, Major John B. Armstrong, Captain William Kelley, and  
                                                 
4 John D. Weaver, The Brownsville Raid , 50. 
5 60th Congress 1st Session 1907-1908 Senate Documents, Brownsville Affray Serial Set 5252, 19:41.  
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Mayor Fred Combe.6 Predictably, the committee assumed the soldiers were guilty and they 
immediately dispatched an alarming telegraph to the war department. With the death of a white 
civilian and the wounding of a white politician, the town was in an uproar, and its citizens would 
not rest until somebody was brought to justice. Weeks later President Teddy Roosevelt 
summarily discharged the soldiers denying them back pay and benefits.  
This project will not provide a day-to-day narrative of the Brownsville Affair, as 
historians have called it, nor will it present any new research. Rather, this project will offer a new 
interpretive framework for looking at the incident and its aftermath. Specifically, it examines the 
complicity of the local and national government in establishing the collective guilt of the all-
black 25
th
 Infantry and will examine aspects of the Brownsville Affair that have not yet either 
been explored or considered. Chapter one discusses three separate cases involving Black soldiers 
and their interactions on liberty with Brownsville citizens. Collectively they reveal the town’s 
bigotry against Black soldiers, the military’s refusal to confront it, and the increasing tension 
between Black soldiers and Brownsville citizens.   
Chapter two examines the dismissal of the 25
th
 Infantry by President Theodore Roosevelt. In 
particular, it pays close attention to the actions of Booker T. Washington and others who tried to 
convince Roosevelt not to issue the discharge. The actions of Roosevelt shocked African-
Americans who were loyal to both Roosevelt and the Republican Party. Despite the pleas of black 
leaders, Roosevelt summarily dismissed the members of the 25
th
 although some of them had 
served valiantly in the Spanish-American war, including several who won awards for valor. 
Although Roosevelt had no evidence by which to dismiss the soldiers he nonetheless removed all 
                                                 
6 Weaver, The Brownsville Raid, 69.  
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167 from the Army.  
Chapter three looks at the court-martial of Captain Edgar Macklin who as “officer of the 
day” was responsible for the entire fort on the night of the shootings. Macklin’s testimony and the 
statements by other soldiers and officers confirm that Macklin committed several serious 
violations that night. Thus, within the chapter, little evidence suggests that Macklin was not in his 
quarters on August 13, 1906 during the shooting, but perhaps, in the town as a participant. The 
court-martial of Macklin is important since a conviction would have exonerated and reinstated 
members of the 25
th
. Despite evidence to the contrary Macklin was found not guilty.  
 
Chapter four concludes by making a case for reparations based upon government complicity. 
Although the Brownsville affair is a pivotal event in both African-American and United States 
history, the subject has been largely ignored for the past 35 years. In 1971 historians John D. 
Weaver and Anne J. Lane tackled the Brownsville Affair in separate studies. Weaver’s book, The 
Brownsville Affair is based largely upon the 19091910 court of inquiry and is the most 
authoritative. Weaver argued that the black soldiers were unjustifiably punished without a 
hearing; consequently, he inferred that President Roosevelt was at fault. Weaver concludes in The 
Brownsville Raid that President Roosevelt’s policies in dealing with the affair ignored the 
evidence presented in the case.  In 1997 Weaver published a follow-up book on the subject titled, 
The Senator and the Sharecropper’s Son. This book follows the life of the lone surviving member 
of the 25
th
, Dorsie Willis, and it discusses the efforts of politicians who convinced Nixon to sign 
the bill that reversed the dishonorable discharge order given by Roosevelt.7 Ann J. Lane, on the 
other hand, studied the reaction of the Black press and its involvement with Black leaders such as 
                                                 
7 Weaver, The Brownsville Raid ; The Sharecropper and the Senator (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1997), 209. 
  
5 
Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois in her book The Brownsville Affair. Her study 
concluded that the black presses’ reaction to the news of the soldiers’ discharges from active duty 
initiated an immediate response from the black community and, like Weaver, she argues that the 
25
th
 was unfairly discharged. Less generous than some other authors, Lane described Roosevelt as 
"narrow-minded and self-righteous," embodying the least attractive of Victorian characteristics. 
Sympathetic to the "unfortunate men," Lane viewed the soldiers as relegated to the margins of the 
conflict on the political stage.8 Since the publication of these two monographs, The Brownsville 
Raid and The Brownsville Affair, not much has been written about the affair; however, they will 
assist this thesis in offering a new interpretation of the eventful night in Brownsville, Texas in 
1906. With regards to the mysterious actions of Captain Edgar Macklin on the night of the 
shootings, both Weaver and Lane mention Macklin as a “participant only as the realm of an 
officer on duty” and both fail to analyze his role while serving in that capacity. Both authors 
instead look at “the bigger picture,” which embodies the role of the black press and the 
collaboration of the military and the federal government. This thesis provides major and 
compelling evidence that in the Brownsville Affair a strong case for restitution and reparations 
can made on behalf of the dismissed soldiers.9  Despite the reversal of the discharge in 1910 and 
in 1972, this thesis will argue more needs to be done on behalf of these soldiers and their 
families. Three levels of injustice occurred in Brownsville. The first level of injustice began with 
the municipality of Brownsville. A committee of businessmen, lawyers, judges, and elected 
officials were organized to investigate the raid. At the conclusion of their investigation the 
                                                 
8 Garna L. Christian, Black Soldiers in Jim Crow Texas, 1899-1917(College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1995), 85.  
9 Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair (New York: Kennikat Press, 1971). Other studies on Brownsville 
include: James Tinsley, “The Brownsville Affray,” M.A. Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1948; “Discharged 
Without Honor,” A&E Television, 2000.  
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committee sent alarming letters to the War Department. The next level of injustice was at the 
military level. Earlier conflicts between black soldiers and the townspeople, if handled properly 
by Major Charles Penrose and Captain Edgar Macklin, could have prevented the raid. Moreover, 
not a single historian has studied Captain Edgar A. Macklin’s actions while on duty that 
particular night. Overall, this study will place Macklin under close scrutiny to determine whether 
his own testimony will convict or exonerate his actions that night.  
In sum, this thesis will build a case for reparations for all 167 soldiers dismissed without 
definitive evidence of their involvement in Brownsville. Reconstructing the Dreamland: The 
Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, Race, Reparations and Reconciliation, by Alfred L. Brophy suggest 
such justification. In this book, Brophy reexamines the destruction of Black Tulsa and makes a 
strong case for reparations.  This project attempts to do the same.10 Lastly, the decision by 
President Theodore Roosevelt to dismiss the soldiers without a hearing or court-martial was a 











                                                 
10 Alfred Brophy, Reconstructing the Dreamland: The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).  
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Chapter 1: No Niggers or Dogs Allowed  
The Negro troops would never have been quartered at Fort Sheridan without a protest if I was to remain in command 
here…I never like them and the farther away they are kept the better it pleases me. For the life of me I can not 
understand why the United States should try to make soldiers out of them. Certainly there are enough fine white men 
in this big country to make soldiers of without recruiting from such a source.   
-Colonel William L. Pitcher, Macon Daily Telegraph, November 7, 1906 Senate Documents  
During the late 1860s the 25
th
 Infantry was established at Jackson Barracks in Louisiana, 
where it maintained martial law in the racially tense period of Reconstruction. In 1870 the 25
th
 
reported to Fort Davis, Texas, which was abandoned by both the Union and the Confederate 
armies after the war. During military campaigns from 1875 to 1880, the 25
th
 pursued Mexicans 
and Indians across the Mexico border, and during the Spanish-American war members of the 25
th
 
served heroically.  
On May 27, 1906, the citizens of Brownsville received word that a black regiment was 
being assigned to Fort Brown. The news was greeted with alarm in both the white community and 
across the border into Mexico. The Mexican community in and around Brownsville recalled the 
raids of black soldiers during the 1870s, and joined forces with white conservatives to protest the 
pending arrival of the 25
th
. Many Mexicans remembered the raids of the Buffalo soldiers thirty 
years prior and they shared the same resentment that white citizens of Brownsville possessed. 
Blacks would not be welcomed. The War Department received numerous telegrammed 
complaints.  Secretary of War William H. Taft responded quickly to those complaints:  
The fact is that a certain amount of race prejudice 
between white and black seems to have become almost 
universal throughout the country, and no matter where colored 
troops are sent there are always some who make objection to 
their coming. It is a fact, however, as shown by our records, 
that colored troops are quite as well disciplined and behaved as 
the average of other troops.   
8 
The records of the Army also tend to show that white soldiers 
average a greater degree of intemperance than colored ones. It 
has sometimes happened that communities which objected to 
the coming of colored soldiers have, on account of their good 
conduct, entirely changed their view and commended their 
good behavior to the War Department.11
Established originally as the village of Dapto, its name was changed to Brownsville in 
honor of George Brown, a wealthy landowner and merchant who made a fortune in the 1830s. 
During the Civil War the racially diverse town emerged as an important seaport for the 
Confederacy as rebel soldiers used the city’s port to smuggle Confederate goods into Mexico. In 
the post-reconstruction era Brownsville emerged as a mid-sized city in the 1880s; however, when 
a yellow fever epidemic gripped the city unrepentantly much of the business community left the 
city, leaving behind working-class whites and lower-income Mexicans. Black civilians which 
numbered less than one hundred in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, most of them were males 
discharged from army service, depended on local military and ranching economies for subsistence.12
 
                                                 
11 Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, c. 
1920), I, 443.
12
 James N. Leiker, Racial Borders: Black Soldier Along The Rio Grande (College Station: Texas A&M 
Press 2002), 73.   
12 Unfortunately a good history on Brownsville has yet to be written. However, several studies look at the 
city in a variety of contexts: William L. Adams, Portrait of a Border City: Brownsville, Texas (Austin: Easkin Press, 
1997); Milo Kearney, Still More Studies in Brownsville History (Brownsville, TX: University of Texas-Brownsville, 
1991); Kearney, Studies in Rio Grande Valley History (Brownsville, TX: University of Texas-Brownsville, 2005); 
Kearney, Further Studies in Rio Grande Valley History, (Brownsville, TX: University of Texas-Brownsville, 2006); 
Frank Schubert, Voices of the Buffalo Soldier: Records, Reports, and Recollections of Military Life and Service in 









Despite local opposition to the presence of black soldiers Mayor Frederick Combe, who had once 
served with black troops, ordered his police force to show equal respect to black soldiers as they 
did for white troops.13 The 25
th
 relieved the Twenty-sixth Infantry of their duty in Brownsville on 
July 28, 1906.14 In the beginning, the Twenty-fifth enjoyed a pleasant atmosphere, although their 
mere presence made racial tensions inevitable. During their off-duty hours the troops enjoyed 
drinking and dancing in many saloons throughout the town. However, several white-owned bars 
established Jim-Crow policies by either refusing to serve black troops or by setting up small 
“black bars” in the rear of their establishments. As tensions escalated over the Jim Crow policies 
of local bars, a former member of the 25
th
, Pvt. Holloman, opened the first black-owned bar in 
Brownsville in an effort to make money and also in an effort to avert racial hostilities.15 A series 
of incidents between black soldiers and white civilians developed days before the actual raid, 
which, if handled properly, could have quelled the tensions.16 These incidents were the Baker-
Reid case, the Tate-Newton case, and the Lon Evans case.   
The Baker-Reed case was the first racial incident and took place on Sunday, August 12, 
1906, when Private Oscar W. Reid and another soldier returned after a late night liberty from 
Matamoros, Mexico, by ferry. Customs inspector A. Y. Baker apprehended them at the pier and 
accused them of drunkenness and disorderly conduct. He instructed both of the soldiers to “move 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately a adequate history on Brownsville has yet to be written. However, several studies look at a 
city in a variety of contexts: William L. Adams, Portrait of a Border City: Brownsville, Texas (Austin: Easkin Press, 
1997); Milo Kearney, Still More Studies in Brownsville History (Brownsville, TX: University of Texas-Brownsville, 
1991); Kearney, Studies in Rio Grande Valley History (Brownsville, TX: University of Texas-Brownsville, 2005); 
Kearney, Further Studies in Rio Grande Valley History, (Brownsville, TX: University of Texas-Brownsville, 2006); 
Frank Schubert, Voices of the Buffalo Soldier: Records, Reports, and Recollections of Military Life and Service in the 





 Session 1907-1908 Senate Documents, Brownsville Affray, Serial Set 5252, 19:36-37; 
Hereafter referred to as Senate Documents, 19 .  
15 Senate Documents, 19: 41-42.  
16 On every payday a soldier faced robbery. If he refused to relinquish the cash; he faced a beaten and a 
night in jail courtesy of the (town) Sheriff and his deputies: James N. Leiker, Racial Borders: Black Soldier Along 
The Rio Grande (College Station: Texas A&M Press 2002), 127-128.  
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on” and then he shoved Reid off a plank into a quarry filled with solid mud and water. The next 
morning, Reid reported the incident to his company commander, Captain Edgar A. Macklin. 
Macklin responded to Reid’s complaint by sarcastically asking him if he had difficulty surviving 
in the quarry. Macklin then told Reid that he had no right to file a report since he was drunk when 
the alleged incident occurred.17
A second confrontation involving black soldiers occurred later that day when a white lady 
was allegedly attacked by a black soldier. The Brownsville Herald told its readers that “Mrs. 
Evans” was attacked near her front door after returning from a trip.  The headline read: “Negro 
Soldier Invaded Private Premises Last Night and Attempted to Seize a White Lady.” For most 
white southerners-the words: Negro, Soldier, and White Lady, conjured up images of black 
soldiers wantonly raping white women. The article mentioned the attack on Mrs. Evans and it 
accepted her word that she was assaulted by a black soldier. “The light was shining brightly 
through the back doors of the house and Mrs. Evans saw plainly that the man was a Negro 
dressed in a soldier’s uniform. By the time she was carried into the house and recovered 
sufficiently to tell what happened, the Negro had disappeared entirely.” The article concluded by 
mentioning that Mrs. Evans was “feeling quite shaken up,” but not before labeling the unknown 
alleged black assailant a “brute.” By labeling the assailant a brute, readers were being told that all 
black men were on the rampage looking for white women to rape. The mood of the article 
conveyed the attitude of the city toward the presence of black soldiers. The attack upon Mrs. 
Evans confirmed many of the fears local whites had when it was announced that the all-black 25
th
 
would be stationed at Fort Brown. Like many other southerners they could not stomach seeing 
                                                 
17 Brownsville Daily Herald, August 13, 1906. UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives, UT 
Libraries, Brownsville, Texas.  
11 
black men, carrying weapons, and being trained to kill. The mere idea of a black soldier was 
unimaginable but the presence of black soldiers certainly frightened many white southerners. The 
coverage of the attack upon Mrs. Evans certainly fanned the flames of unrest that would erupt the 
following day.18
The next day, Lon Evans informed Major Penrose that one of his soldiers committed an 
assault against his wife. The mayor suggested that he and Evans take the accusation to Major 
Penrose. Mayor Combe escorted Evans to the Fort Brown post in his carriage. At the post, the 
two men were given directions to Major Penrose’s quarters. As they walked to Penrose’s 
quarters, they observed him on the fort parade grounds. The mayor introduced Evans to Major 
Penrose and they discussed the incident. Major Penrose listened to Evans’s recollection of the 
alleged assault committed on his wife:   
Last night around nine o’clock, my wife was assaulted 
by a colored who she is positive was a nigger. We were 
returning from the train station late and met with a friend of 
ours. He was riding a pony that we loaned him and he insisted 
that my wife ride it instead of walk. He assisted her as she 
mounted the pony and then she went on ahead. We walked 
slowly behind her and as she made it home, she entered the 
house towards the back gate then she dismounted. She opened 
the gate and neared the ash barrel in front of the house when a 
man appeared from behind her and grabbed her hair. He threw 
her to the ground as she screamed and then he fled. 19
  
 
Evans’ description of the assailant was that he witnessed a large Negro wearing a slouch hat, blue 
shirt and khaki trousers. Major Penrose informed Evans that he had many men fitting that 
particular description. He asked Evans if his wife, Mrs. Evans, would be willing to provide a 
more detailed description of her attacker. Evans stated that she was unable to give a description 
because she was too traumatized. The Brownsville Daily Herald reported that “Mrs. Evans is 
                                                 
18 Brownsville Daily Herald, August 13, 1906. UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives, UT Libraries, 
Brownsville, Texas. 
19 Brownsville Daily Herald, August 13, 1906. UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives, UT Libraries, 
Brownsville, Texas. 
12 
feeling quite shaken up today, though suffering no bodily injury beyond a very sore place where 
her hair was grabbed, and also her neck, which was twisted by the brute in jerking her from the 
steps.”20 Penrose believed that Evans’s claim was without merit and was certain that none of the 
men under his command was the assailant. He assured Evans that the avid prostitution in and 
around Mexico was enough to satisfy his men sexually. As Evans got back in his carriage, Mayor 
Combe escorted Major Penrose aside and warned him, “Major, if you allow your men to go into 
town tonight I will not be responsible for their lives.” 
21
 Major Penrose assured Combe that he 
would restrict all soldiers to the base. Subsequently, he ordered Captain Macklin, the officer of 
the day, to notify all the soldiers at dinner that all liberty passes were rescinded as of 8:00 p.m. 
Macklin then sent three patrols into town to retrieve those soldiers who were off base at the time 
of the order restricting them at the base.22  
The third and final confrontation took place on the evening of Monday, August 13, 1906, 
the actual night of the raid. The Tate-Newton case involved another soldier, James W. Newton 
and another customs inspector, Fred Tate. While Newton and Private Frank J. Lipscomb were 
walking back to the base to comply with orders, they approached a group of white ladies 
obstructing their path. According to Newton they made a single file line in order to bypass the 
ladies.23 However, Major A.P. Blocksom, a military investigator, later reported that although the 
ladies were obstructing the sidewalk, Newton and Lipscomb “jostled” the ladies as they passed.24  
The two soldiers continued their conversation until suddenly, Tate, a customs inspector for the 
                                                 
20 Ibid, August 13, 1906. 
21 Lane, The Brownsville Affair, 71. 
22 Senate Documents, 19: 182-184. 
23 Senate Documents, 19: 36-37. 






city of Brownsville and husband of one of the ladies on the sidewalk, struck Newton on the head 
with a revolver.25 Witnesses stated that Tate’s remedy was not only too drastic, but it was  
conducted “in the manner of the South.” Macklin however, disagreed with Blocksom’s  
report:  
[Newton] was not an incensed or angry, but he felt 
hurt. Newton was a splendid soldier, a man of good habits, and 
I do not believe, knowing the man, that he would deliberately 
pass any people on the sidewalk, white or colored, and brush 
against them or knock them off. He was my company clerk for 
a long time, and was extremely polite and obedient.26
 
A culmination of all these minor incidents involving the soldiers prompted many white leaders 
and politicians to consider replacing Blacks in the military. However, little consideration was 
given to fully investigate these few mishaps in order to maintain peace within small towns that 
hosted Black soldiers. These events added to the already mounting tensions and after Brownsville 
southern politicians made use of these incidents to make a strong case against black military 
participation. As part of an effort to remove all black soldiers from the military, Texas 
Congressman James Luther Slayden argued that Negroes were unfit for military duty. He 
fervently believed that the relationship between the soldier and the people, were not in common 
at anytime with the Negro soldier.27 During his speech, Congressman Slayden detailed specific 
conflicts between the Negro soldiers and white inhabitants in various parts of the country, 
especially at Brownsville. Slayden stated:  
The theory that the killing and wounding was done by 
citizens of Brownsville masquerading in soldiers’ uniforms, in 
the language of Secretary [Howard] Taft, was no grotesque, if 
                                                 
25 Lane, The Brownsville Affair, 16.      
26 Senate Documents, 19:37. 
27 Ibid. 19:37; John Nance Garner, who represented Brownsville’s district in Congress and later  
became Vice-President of the United States under Franklin D. Roosevelt, sponsored many resolutions for removal of 
blacks from the United States military. James N. Leiker, Racial Borders: Black Soldier Along The Rio 
Grande(College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2002).  
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its improbability and absurdity as hardly to call for discussion 
or comment […]Fortunately, for the citizens of Brownsville, 
whose politics might be thought by some persons to have 
caused the trouble in the only two previous occasions on which 
soldiers were personally assaulted[…] It seems to me to be too 
absurd that at this late day we should be asking who did the 
shooting. I fail to see how there is room for honest doubt if the 
soldiers had been white and the circumstances the same; if the 
same mass of clear, strong evidence against them had been 
supplied and if the President [Roosevelt] had dismissed them 
from the service in the same manner, there not only would have 
been no doubt as to who were the murderers, but the actions of 
the President would have been almost unanimously approved. 
But then the whites are not a valuable political asset handled in 
bulk, which explains many things.28
 
Consequently, Slayden’s speech was ignored and his bill, to rid Blacks from the United States 
 military, quickly failed. It is fair to assume that Slayden, from Texas, ultimately sided with his  
constituency due to his outrage that such an event took place in his state. The mindset of Slayden 
toward black troops was typical of white politicians and civilians. It was this type of thinking that 
led certain “rough characters” to meet the 25
th   
Infantry at the Brownsville train station seeking 
revenge when it was announced that they were being replaced with an all-white unit. The War 
Department immediately dispatched a telegram to the Brownsville authorities to ensure the 
soldiers’ safe departure. Naturally, the authorities in Brownsville assured the War Department 
that they would protect the black soldiers but they were unsure if they could protect them fully. 
Major Penrose received an additional telegram ordering his men to protect themselves in case of 
an alleged attack. Members of the 25
th
 Infantry boarded the train and left peacefully headed to 
Fort Reno. Unfortunately, members of the 25
th
 Infantry would be dishonorably discharged several 
months later much to the chagrin of black soldiers, the black community, and black leaders such  
as Booker T. Washington, while the 26
th
 Infantry was given a hero’s welcome upon their arrival.29
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.    Chapter 2: Reevaluating Roosevelt  
The Secretary of War (Taft): I have read through General [E.A.] Garlington’s report dated October 22, [1906] 
submitted to me by [William H. Taft].  I direct that the recommendation [discharge without honor] of General 
Garlington be complied with, and at the same time his concluding portion of his report be published with our 
sanction as given the reason for the action.  
[Signed] Theodore Roosevelt, November 5, 1906, Macon Daily Telegraph   
Theodore Roosevelt became president of the United States in 1901 after William McKinley’s 
assassination and in 1904 he was elected to a full term in office. After the Brownsville raid, 
Roosevelt ordered a full investigation of the incident on August 16, 1906. He immediately 
assigned Major August P. Blocksom of the Inspector General’s office as the lead investigator. 
Blocksom graduated from West Point in 1877. While in the Army, he rose to Inspector General in 
1905. As the newly appointed investigator, his duties consisted of disciplining erratic troops and 
conducting investigations on any infractions caused by troops on military duty.  Major Blocksom 
traveled to Brownsville, Texas, on August 18, 1906, to begin his investigation for the President. 
Two days later he telegraphed the War Department: “Causes of disturbance are racial. People did 
not desire colored troops here and showed they thought them inferior socially by certain slights 
and denial of privileges…Soldiers resented this.”30 Witnesses subpoenaed by Mayor Combe and 
Blocksom concluded that without a doubt the assailants were black soldiers. Blocksom added to 
his report that the raid was “pre-concerted,” that many of the men must have known of the plan. 
“Many of these old soldiers who had nothing to do with the raid must know something tangible as 
to the identity of the criminals. If they do not disclose their knowledge they should be made to 
suffer with others more guilty.”31 Every soldier denied knowledge of the shooting. Blocksom 
concluded that their silence implied participation or at the very least consent. According to 
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Blocksom’s report, which was submitted on August 29, the raid was provoked by the civilians’ 
slights to the soldiers because of their race and was carried out by nine to fifteen soldiers. 
Ultimately, twelve men were accused by the U.S. Army for perpetrating the crime and were 
charged with the murder of Frank Natus and the attempted murder of Ynagcio Dominguez. The 
suspects were:  
Sgt. Darby W. O. Brawner of Company C; Sgt. James 
R. Reid of Company B; Sgt. William E. Allison; Cpl. David 
Powell of Company D; Cpl. Willie H. Miller of Company C; 
Cpl. Charles H. Madison of Company C; Pvt. Joseph H. 
Howard of Company C; Pvt. James Newton of Company C; 
Pvt. Charles W. Askew of Company C; Pvt. Oscar W. Reid of 
Company C; and Pvt. John Holloman of Company B.32
 
Infantry Department Commander Major General William S. McCaskey stated 
that the selection of these men was a gross injustice:  
The reason(s) for the selection of these men is a 
mystery. The manner by which their names were procured. 
There is no evidence that the majority of them were in any way 
directly connected with the affair.33
  
 
The charges of murder and attempted murder against the twelve defendants were flimsy or 
circumstantial at best. Nonetheless, they were charged because a white civilian was dead and 
somebody had to pay. Unsure of how to handle the twelve men charged murder and attempted 
murder, Major Penrose contacted the War Department. Days later, President Roosevelt delivered 
orders to enrose to leave the prisoners under the control of the military authorities at Fort Sam 
Houston in San Antonio. Angered that his men were facing trumped-up charges, Penrose devised 
a plan to find the guilty parties. The first plan was to hire three black detectives and have them go 
undercover as members of the 25
th
 in an effort to find the guilty parties. The second plan was to 
announce to the three companies that if no one confessed guilt, he would arbitrarily discharge 20 
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percent of the companies each month. To Penrose’s disappointment, Major General McCaskey 
felt that both plans were absurd. During a subsequent investigation Lieutenant Colonel Leonard 
A. Lovering, Acting Inspector General of Southwestern Division, questioned the men on the 
problems they had encountered prior to August 13, 1906. In particular he wanted to know where 
they were during the shootings and whether they knew of any plans by fellow members of the 25
th
 
to shoot up the city. The men denied knowing or participating in the incident. Meanwhile, 
President Roosevelt studied sworn statements of the twelve soldiers collected by Colonel 
Lovering. After President Roosevelt weighed the reports of Major Penrose, Major Blocksom, and 
Colonel Lovering, he called for another investigation to be conducted by Brigadier General 
Ernest A. Garlington, a southerner and an avid racist. Garlington was from Newberry Hill, South 
Carolina, and was unapologetically racist. With orders from President Roosevelt, he interviewed 
every prisoner separately in San Antonio although it was merely procedural. He had already come 
to the conclusion that they were guilty. Prior to the interrogations Garlington was given 
permission by President Roosevelt to threaten the whole battalion with a dishonorable discharge 
if no one confessed to the shootings. The ultimatum was to no avail. Garlington agreed with 
Blocksom’s conclusion that some black soldiers were guilty in a “conspiracy of silence.”34  
On October 22, 1906, General Garlington recommended that all enlisted men of the 
Twenty-fifth Infantry who served in companies B, C, and D be dishonorably discharged and 
barred from future service in the armed forces and government employment.35
 
President 
Roosevelt then summoned Booker T. Washington to the White House to inform the wizard of 
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Tuskegee about his intentions to dismiss the soldiers at Brownsville. Washington often referred to 
President Roosevelt as a friend and was troubled that Roosevelt was making a terrible mistake in 
rushing to judgment. Washington asked if some soldiers would be allowed to re-enlist. President 
Roosevelt said no. Despite President Roosevelt’s actions Washington continued his support for 
Roosevelt in the aftermath of Brownsville. In a letter to Oswald Garrison Villard dated November 
10, 1906 four days after the publicized dinner, Washington informed Villard of the meeting:  
I have just read your editorial on punishing the 
colored troops. When I saw you in New York, I knew what was 
to take place, but the President bound me to absolute secrecy. I 
did my full duty in trying to persuade him from the course not 
only when I saw him, but wrote him strongly after reaching 
New York. I am not going to give up. As soon as he returns I 
expect to have a conference with him with a view of arranging 
some plan to do justice to innocent men. There is no law, 
human or divine, which justifies the punishment of an innocent 
man.  I have the strongest faith in the President’s honesty of 
intention, high mindedness of purpose, sincere unselfishness 
and courage, but I regret for these reasons all the more that this 
thing has occurred.36  
 
The meeting Washington hoped for in this letter never happened. The reasons Washington 
supported Roosevelt were ambiguous. In a letter to Washington, T. Thomas Fortune challenged 
him to rethink his unwavering support for the President.  
I am sorry that the President did not let you blue 
pencil his message, as far as it relates to us, and all the more so 
as he has employed throughout the message your phraseology 
and often your idioms. His advice that Afro-Americans who 
know nothing of their criminals shall help to hunt them down 
and his adoption of the lynch law method of slaying the 
innocent with the guilty are vile propositions calculated to do 
us great injury…   
The President has forfeited the confidence and good esteem of 
the Afro-American people and largely of the American people 
by the adoption of Southern ideas and methods in dealing with 
us… and I…think that you have gone as far with him as you 
can afford to.  
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He has two years more as President, and you have the reminder 
of your life as the controlling genius of the Tuskegee Institute 
and leader of the Afro-American people, and your future will 
depend largely on how far you allow it to be understood that 
you are sponsor for what he says and does as far as the Afro-
American people are concerned…37
T. Thomas Fortune was a founder of the Afro-American League, a precursor to the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, which was established in 1909. Washington 
tried to discourage black leaders like Fortune from publicly criticizing President Roosevelt’s 
decision to dismiss the soldiers.38 Instead, he felt that he could use his influence with Roosevelt 
to encourage him to reconsider his decision; but never did he fully challenge Roosevelt. In a letter 
to President Roosevelt, Washington expressed his reasons for displeasure with the decision:  
 
I have asked our mutual friend, Mr. Charles W. 
Anderson, to lay before you the following points, to be 
considered, if possible, before you receive any of the colored 
delegations that are likely to seek an interview regarding the 
colored troops.  
First: Of the present deep feeling that your order was given out 
at a time when the race was much disheartened and sore on the 
account of the Atlanta Riot.   
Second: There is a deep feeling that some wholly innocent men 
are being punished.  
Third: The fact that the order appeared on the night, after the 
election, created the impression that it was held up to secure 
the Negro vote.  
Fourth: In case you make any modification of your order, I 
hope you will find some way to give credit to the friends of the 
administration, who have sought to help in the matter, and not 
let the enemies of the administration, who are seeking every 
means possible to destroy the influence of the administration, 
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get full credit for it.39
Washington purposely kept his displeasure with President Roosevelt quiet because he did not 
want to jeopardize the mid-term elections for the Republican Party. And President Roosevelt 
tactically withheld the order until after the midterm election for fear of losing black votes. After 
numerous attempts to get Roosevelt to rethink his decision; the President scorned Washington for 
his persistence:40 “You can not have any information to give me privately to which I could pay 
heed, my dear Mr. Washington…because the information on which I act came out of the 
investigation itself.”41 Eventually, President Roosevelt agreed with Garlington’s recommendation 
to dismiss the soldiers. The discharges were issued by the United States Army on November 5, 
1906. The announcement was given on November 9 just one day after the election. Special Order 
No. 266 was transmitted from the War Department as such:  
By direction of the President, the following-named 
enlisted men [in] Companies B, C, and D, Twentieth-fifth 
Infantry, certain members of which organizations participated 
in the riotous disturbance which occurred in Brownsville, 
Texas, on the night of August 13, 1906, will be discharged 
without honor from the Army by their respective commanding 
officers and forever debarred from reenlisting in the Army or 
Navy of the United States, as well as from employment in any 
civil capacity under the Government.    
In all, one hundred and sixty-seven names were on the order. One of the more interesting 
soldiers who was dismissed was First Sergeant Mingo Sanders, who fought in Cuba in 1898, and 
remembered dividing rations of hardtack and bacon with a Colonel, Theodore Roosevelt, after the 
battle of Las Guasimas. On November 16 the first discharge papers were served to the men of the 
Twenty-fifth Infantry. When Roosevelt’s name was mentioned at a black convention later that 
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day, it was received with complete silence.42
The black community was outraged at the dismissal of the soldiers. The fact that it was 
Theodore Roosevelt, whom they supported, sent shock throughout the black community. Blacks 
during the early twentieth century supported the Republican Party wholeheartedly as the party of 
Lincoln. Blacks could not separate themselves from its ideology. The Democratic Party did not 
present a reasonable political alternative for African-Americans.
   43
Lewis Lynne notes in his 1960 
article on “Brownsville: The Reaction of the Negro Press”, Brownsville rocked the black 
community. Reactions to the dismissal came swiftly and bitterly in the Negro press.44 Most 
papers accused President Roosevelt of using the lives of black soldiers for a political agenda. 
Mary Church Terrell, president of the National Association of Colored Women, patiently waited 
in the office of Secretary of War William H. Taft until he would see her on the afternoon of 
November 17. During their meeting Taft told Terrell that he could not do anything about the 
President’s decision. “What do you want me to about it? President Roosevelt has already 
dismissed them and he has gone to Panama. There is nothing I can do.” Mrs. Terrell answered: 
“All I want you to do, Mr. Secretary, is to suspend the order…until an investigation can be 
made.” Shocked at her request Taft informed Terrell that it was not that simple a request. “Is that 
all you want me to do…suspend an order issued by the President of the United States during his 
absence from the country?” Nonetheless, Taft realized that President Roosevelt had made a 
serious mistake and asked President Roosevelt’s secretary to send the President a confidential 
message. It read:  
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New York Republican Club and many others 
appealing for a suspension of the order discharging colored 
troops until your return that you may have a rehearing…Much 
agitation on the subject and it may be well to convince people 
of fairness of hearing by granting rehearing. The reports of the 
officers on which the action was founded will be published 
early next week.45
 
The next day, November 18, Secretary Taft suspended the dismissal order until President 
Roosevelt’s return. After receiving the wireless telegram on Wednesday, November 21, 1906, 
President Roosevelt wrote:  
Discharge is not to be suspended unless there are new 
facts of such importance as to warrant your cabling me…I care 
nothing whatever for the yelling of either the politicians or the 
sentimentalists. The offense was most heinous and the 
punishment I inflicted was imposed after due deliberation.46
 
 
Immediately, Taft released the evidence that President Roosevelt based his dismissal decision 
upon. The New York Times stated that the content of the report did not prove the guilt or 
innocence of the 25
th
. In response Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio introduced a bill directing the 
Secretary of War to supply the Senate with every official document pertaining to the case and 
service records of every solider who was dismissed. Roosevelt possessed the privilege, but the 
articles of war did not permit him to inflict it “as a punishment-as though it had been in pursuance 
of the sentence of a court martial.” Taft, as a former judge, must have remembered that “no man 
can be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”47
 
On December 19, 1906, Roosevelt addressed the Senate for the dismissal of the  
soldiers based upon his review of the Army officers’ reports:  
By my direction every effort was made to persuade those 
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innocent of murder among them to separate themselves from the guilty 
by helping bring the criminals to justice. They were warned that if they 
did not take advantage of the offer they would all be discharged from 
the service and forbidden again to enter the employ of the Government. 
They [soldiers] refused to profit from the warning.  I accordingly had 
them discharged. 
 
People have spoken as if the discharge from the service was a 
punishment. I deny emphatically that such is the case, because as 
punishment it is utterly inadequate. The punishment for mutineers or 
murderers such as those guilty at the Brownsville assault is death; and a 
punishment only less severe ought to be metered out to those who have 
aided and abetted mutiny and murder and treason by refusing to help in 
their detection.  
  
Be it remembered always that these men were all in the service of the 
United States under contracts of enlistment, which by their terms and 
statutes were terminable by my direction as Commander-in-Chief of the 
Army. It was my clear duty to terminate those contracts when the public 
interest demanded it; and it would have been a betrayal of the public 
interest on my part not to terminate the contracts which were keeping in 
the service of the United States a body of mutineers and murderers.  
Any assertion that these men were dealt with harshly because they were 
colored men is utterly without foundation. Officers or enlisted men, 
white men or colored men, who were guilty of such conduct, would 
have been treated in precisely the same way; for there can be nothing 
more important than for the United States Army, in all its membership, 
to understand that its arms can not be turned with impunity against the 
peace and order of the civil community.   
There are plenty of precedents for the action taken. I call your attention 
to the memoranda herewith submitted from The Military Secretary’s 
office of the War Department, and a memorandum from The Military 
Secretary inclosing a piece by ex-Corporal Hesse, now chief of division 
in The Military Secretary’s office, together with a letter from District 
Attorney James Wilkerson, of New Orleans. The district attorney’s 
letter recites several cases in which white United States soldiers, being 
arrested for crime, were tried, and every soldier and employee of the 
regiment, or in the fort at which the soldier was stationed, volunteered 
all they knew, both before and at the trial, so as to secure justice.48
Roosevelt believed that there was a precedent for dismissal. Among the cases that he 
acknowledged in his letter to the Senate were: Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant’s dismissal of 
the 20
th
 Illinois battalion from the Thirteenth Army Corp on November 16, 1862, when members 
of this regiment broke into a store and took goods valued at $1, 240. General Grant used his 
                                                 
48 
 
Senate Documents, 19: 182. 
 
24 
authority to ferret out the guilty men in this incident. In a related case, General Robert E. Lee of 
the army of Northern Virginia issued an order in October 1864 that dismissed a battalion for 
cowardly conduct stating that there were some men belonging to the organization who were 
obliged to share in the common disgrace because the good of the service demanded it.49  
Roosevelt then brought up several cases of shootings involving black soldiers and white 
civilians. Around midnight on October 19, 1899, in Laredo, Texas, a flurry of gunshots was 
supposedly conducted by Company D of the Twenty-fifth Infantry. It was stated that a police 
officer named Will Stoner was surrounded by black soldiers and beaten within an inch of his life. 
In El Paso on February 16, 1900, black soldiers took their rifles from an arms rack and marched 
to a local jail freeing two soldiers held for trial on the charges of drunkenness and disorderly 
conduct. They fired into the jailhouse killing a police officer on duty. A noncommissioned officer 
in charge of the barracks relinquished the keys of the armed rack. During the raid, Corporal 
James W. Hull, a member of Company A was killed; he was later believed to be one of the 
culprits. As soon as the Twenty-fifth’s commanding officer, Captain R. H.R. Loughborough 
learned of this particular incident in the morning of February 17, 1900, the whereabouts of every 
man was determined; the arms and all ammunition were secured and placed under lock and key; 
and every precaution was taken preventing soldiers from leaving their post. Roosevelt used this 
incident and compared it to the Brownsville. In order to capture the culprit, likened to the El Paso 
Affair, Roosevelt explained that the dismissal of the 25
th 
was the first step in that process.50  
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Figure 1. The contradiction of Theodore Roosevelt as a candidate and as President of the United  
States. Courtesy of UT-Brownsville Southmost College.  
Moreover, Roosevelt’s perception on race was considered progressive in 1906. As a 
progressive New Yorker, Roosevelt believed that blacks, as well as whites, were men. “It is of the 
utmost importance to all our people that we shall deal with each man on his merits as a man, and 
not deal with him merely as a member of a given race; that we shall judge each man by his 
conduct and not his color. This is important for the white man, and it is far more important for the 
colored man.”51 Yet, Roosevelt was known as a “walking contradiction” who normally vouched 
on one side of an issue and then later stood on the other side of the same issue. Theodore 
Roosevelt, a veteran of the United States Volunteers 1
st
 Calvary, at times, made numerous 
declarations for and against black troops. He often inferred that black troops depended heavily 
upon their white officers and  
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that black noncommissioned officers generally lacked the ability to command like the best class 
of whites.52
Roosevelt, on one occasion, described an incident during a critical period of the fighting 
at San Juan Hill under heavy fire from the Spaniards, under the strain, that none of the white 
regulars or Rough Riders showed the slightest sign of weakening; however, he had to draw his 
revolver to stop a group of Black infantrymen from fleeting to the rear.53 Through thorough 
description in the book, The Rough Riders, Roosevelt remarked that Black soldiers “are, of 
course, peculiarly dependent upon their white officers, thus, on occasion they produce 
noncommissioned officers who can take the initiative and accept responsibility precisely like the 
best class of whites; therefore, it is not seen as normal, thus, it can not be expected.54 Roosevelt 
charged that “a score or so Black infantryman” who, he stated, drifted to the rear “either helping 
wounded men…This I could not allow, as it was depleting my line, so I jumped up, and walking a 
few yards to the rear, drew my revolver, halted the retreating soldiers, and called out to them that 
I appreciated the gallantry with which they had fought and would be sorry to hurt them, but that I 
should shoot the first man who, on any pretense whatever, went to the rear.55 This story, in a 
different version from 10
th
Calvary Sergeant Presley Holliday, was that the men were following 
orders given by a lieutenant to move to the rear and bring up more ammunition.56   
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Figure 2. Political cartoons in the black press expressing dissatisfaction about the incident in Brownsville. Courtesy 
of UT-Brownsville Southmost College.  
 
Furthermore, Roosevelt was always known as a “loose cannon,” making hasty decisions without 
sufficient evidence. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt disobeyed direct orders given 
by the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, not to take any steps affecting the policy of 
McKinley’s administration without consultation. Consequently, ten days after the USS Maine 
was destroyed in Havana harbor which killed over 260 American sailors, Roosevelt telegraphed 
Commodore George Dewey:  
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“In the event of declaration of war [with] Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish 
squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast and then [conduct] offensive operations in Philippine 
Islands.”58 By March 24, 1898 the naval inquiry board investigating the USS Maine’s 
catastrophic explosion concluded that a faulty external clause was the primary reason for 
detonation. For this, no matter how delusional Roosevelt’s enthusiasm in rushing judgment, he 
was both admired and distained by the Republicans. Therefore, Roosevelt’s reason for the 
soldiers’ dismissal was not uncommon, thus, he feared that the soldiers harbored the real culprits 
behind the organization and execution concerning the raid. Harboring these culprits was, as 
Roosevelt felt, based upon racial solidarity:  
 
More evil and sinister counsel never was given to any people 
than that given to colored men by those advisers, whether black 
or white, who, by apology and condonation, encourage conduct 
such as that of the three companies in question. If the colored 
men elect to stand by criminals of their own race because they 
are of their own race, they assuredly lay up for themselves the 
most dreadful day of reckoning. Every farsighted friend of the 
colored race in its efforts to strive onward and upward should 
teach first, as the most important lesson, alike to the white man 
and the black, the duty of treating the individual man strictly on 
his worth as he shows it. Any conduct by colored people which 
tends [sic] to substitute for this rule the rule of standing by and 
shielding an evil doer because he is a member of their race, 
means the inevitable degradation of the colored men. It may 
and probably does mean damage to the white race, but it means 
ruin to the black race.59
 
Roosevelt throughout this letter to the Senate defended his actions of relating to all Americans 
when it came to treating them equally. In doing this, Roosevelt refers to his appointments as the 
staple of equality.   
“Throughout my term of service in the presidency I 
have acted on the principle thus advocated. In the North as in 
the South I have appointed colored men of high character to 
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office, utterly disregarding the protests of those who would 
have kept them out of office because they were colored men.  
So far as was in my power, I have sought to secure for the 
colored people their rights under the law. I have done all I 
could to secure them equal school training when young, equal 
opportunity to earn their livelihood, and achieve their 
happiness when old. I have striven to break up peonage; I have 
upheld the hands of those who, like Judge Jones and Judge 
Speer, have warred against this peonage, because I would hold 
myself unfit to be President if I did not feel the same revolt at 
wrong done to a colored man as I feel at wrong done a white 
man.” 60
              Ohio Senator Joseph Foraker, a 1908 presidential candidate, took up the case for 
the discharged soldiers and in the process a heated debate began between him and the president. 
On the senate floor Foraker laid out the facts of the Brownsville incident. He stated that there 
were only eight legitimate witnesses instead of scores of witnesses that came out of the 
woodworks to convict black soldiers. He looked for evidence that confirmed the soldiers’ guilt 
and found none.   
 
Figure 3. A political cartoon describing Senator Joseph Foraker’s slaying the gigantic Brownsville investigation. 
Courtesy of UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives.  
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 On January 26, 1907, the battle over the Brownsville soldiers between President 
Roosevelt and Ohio Senator Joseph Foraker came to a head at the Gridiron Dinner at the 
Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C. Senator Foraker took his seat to the right of President 
Roosevelt’s table and was not expected to speak. However, Vice-President Samuel G. 
Blythe had other plans. President Roosevelt bantered for nearly an hour commenting on 
the Brownsville case. Blythe introduced Foraker for a rebuttal and he did not disappoint. 
As Foraker discussed the bogus discharge of the 25
th
, President Roosevelt leapt to his feet 
in anger and yelled:  
Some of these men were bloody butchers; they ought to be hung. The 
only reason that I didn’t have them hung was because I couldn’t find out which 
ones of them did the shooting. None of the battalion would testify against 
them…It is my business and the business of nobody else. It is not the business of 
Congress…All the talk on that subject is academic. If they pass a resolution to 
reinstate these men, I will veto it; if they pass it over my veto, I will pay no 
attention to it. I welcome impeachment.61
Because of Foraker’s persistence President Roosevelt found himself defending the dismissal of 
the 25
th 
, nearly two years after he issued the order-Foraker’s persistence worked. On his last 
morning as president, Roosevelt signed the Warner bill that allowed members of the 25
th
 who 
were dishonorably discharged to return to the military in the event they established innocence 
of any connection with the Brownsville raid.62 Despite this re-enlistment clause in the Warner 
legislation only fourteen of the 167 soldiers rejoined the Army: Cpl. Jones A. Coltrane, Cpl. 
Edward L. Daniels, Pvt. Edward Warfield of B Company; Cook Lewis J. Baker, Pvt. Clifford I. 
Adair, Pvt. Henry W. Arvin, Pvt. Calvin Smith, and Pvt. John Smith of C Company; Cook 
Robert Williams, Cpl. Winter Washington, Pvt. Elias Gant, Pvt. John A. Jackson,  
                                                 
61 Senate Documents, 19:11-18. 
62 Weaver, The Brownsville Raid, 248.  
 
31 
Pvt. Samuel E. Scott, and Pvt. William Van Hook of D Company. These men were able to 
maintain their career and receive military benefits for the remainder of the lives. Of these men, 
only Pvt. Edward Warfield survived to witness the exoneration of the Brownsville soldiers in 
1972. Few of the members of the 25
th
 benefited from their chance to re-enlist, and none of the 
soldiers at the rank of sergeant or higher, largely because the offer was not widely publicized. 
Limited the Warner Bill’s effect were, if Roosevelt was wrong about Brownsville, it may have 
salvaged the legacy of the Roosevelt Administration. To the end of his term, however, President 
Roosevelt himself continued to defend his handling of the Brownsville affair. Despite the 
advice of Booker T. Washington, whom he greatly admired, and his own mixed feelings about 
Blacks, with whom he had served in the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt based his decision 
on investigations conducted by high-ranking military officers who based their conclusions on 
race. Pressure from powerful Republicans such as Foraker forced Roosevelt to return to the 




Figure 4. Edward Warfield was one of fourteen soldiers able to re-enlist due to the Warner Act in 1909. 








Chapter 3: The Court-Martial Trial of Captain Edgar A. Macklin  
There was an unquestionable, a very strong prejudice throughout old slave states against black troops. A black man 
in military uniform represents authority and while wearing that “authority” it suggests superiority, therefore, causes 
resentment towards them. It was not because the black soldier is disorderly-for, as the rule, they behave better than 
white soldiers, and, even when drunk, are less trouble to manage-but because they are soldiers. -Chambers 
McKibbin, Colonel, United States Army, March 1, 1900  
On the morning of April 30, 1907, the Court-Martial trial of Captain Edgar A. Macklin 
commenced in San Antonio, Texas. Macklin was charged with “neglect of duty to the prejudice 
of good order and military discipline”, Section 62 the Articles of War. Major Charles W. 
Penrose’s court martial was by default since he was the 25
th 
Infantry’s and Fort Brown’s 
commanding officer, whereas Macklin faced more serious charges since he was officer of the 
day. The Judge-Advocate, who serves as the prosecutor for the military, argued that during the 
night of the shootings Macklin was negligent in carrying out his duties. His activities for that 
evening are outlined below:  
Captain Edgar A. Macklin’s Duty Itinerary as Officer of the Day: August 13, 1906  
7:30pm  Macklin sends five patrol units to wrangle any soldier who has not made it back 
to Fort Brown by 8pm curfew due to threats by Brownsville townspeople. He 
posts a soldier at the wharf for those going to and from Matamoros, Mexico; He 
covers fifteen blocks himself.  
7:35-10:59pm  Macklin enjoys drinking beer and holding casual conversation with Lt. 
Lawrason.  
11:00pm  Taps commences. Macklin receives muster (attendance) reports from senior 
noncommissioned officers (sr. enlisted men).   
11:35pm  Macklin saves several children playing with a vicious black dog in the middle 
of the parade grounds inside Fort Brown. These children are guests at a social 
party held by the Cowen’s. Macklin escorts the children out of the front gate of 
the fort. Subsequently, he returns to his quarters.  
11:50pm  Macklin prepares for bed.  
                                                                                      
11:56-12:01am     The suspicious shooting of the Brownsville Raid commences. During this time,  
    the trumpeter-of-the-guard sounds “call to arms”.  
    Every soldier in all four barracks desperately prepare themselves and report to  
    “general” quarters. Only Macklin is absent.  




   
  Major Penrose orders his men from all three companies B,C, and D to line up 
alongside the Fort Brown’s garrison  wall. Penrose sends numerous soldiers to   
locate Macklin. All are unsuccessful. 
  
12:55am  Macklin testifies during his court-martial trial that he heard a knock at his door,  
 sat up in bed, looked at the clock, and then returned back to sleep.  
1:20am  Macklin mysteriously reappears after an hour and nineteen minutes absent. He 




According to the court martial transcripts, Macklin committed three serious violations that 
evening: consumption of alcohol while on duty, conducting and reporting a false muster report, 
and unlawful absence. Members of the 25
th
 watched this trial closely because a guilty verdict on 
either Macklin or Penrose would have exonerated them.  
Consumption of alcohol while on duty was the first violation taken up by the prosecution. 
Captain Macklin spent time in his quarters with Lt. George C. Lawrason drinking alcohol and 
reading the paper prior to roll call and bunk time on the night of the shootings. Lawrason recalled 
that he remembered drinking a beer, but could not recollect whether Macklin drank or not; nor 
could he remember the conversation between them. According to Lawrason’s testimony, Macklin 
violated War Article 30 and Article 46. He contributed alcohol into a lax atmosphere with a 
subordinate while on duty, disregarding and neglecting the safety of the men at Fort Brown. 
Article 46 states that no officer shall be found drinking while on guard. Under oath Macklin 
admitted to having a beer while on duty. This testimony by itself was enough for the court to 
convict him.  
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Figure 5. The space between the barracks and the officer’s quarters lie the parade grounds of Fort Brown 
in 1906. During the night of the raid, Macklin was last seen saving children from a black dog in the parade 
grounds. Courtesy of UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives.  
The second violation dealt with a false muster report during roll call and bunk time. Soon 
after receiving the reports from the non-commissioned officers in charge, Macklin visited the  
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guardhouses where the sentries were stationed and held inspection.  Macklin committed perjury 
several times while testifying. Macklin was questioned on the official time of “lights out,” and he 
answered that it was eleven o’clock. Macklin was then asked by the Judge-Advocate whether it 
was custom for the officer of the day to carry out orders proceeding 11 o’clock roll call. He did 
not understand the question. Again the question was posed. Macklin confirmed. The Judge-
Advocate then asked Macklin the results of the check-roll call prior to the raid. Macklin stated 
that all were present and accounted for. The Judge-Advocate then asked whether or not Macklin 
understood the meaning of the word “present,” which is defined as every soldier either in their 
quarters or at their assigned post. Macklin stated that he did not for certain know the meaning of 
“present”; however, he stated that he was aware that two soldiers were out on pass and could not 
be located. There were actually three soldiers of his company out that night: Corporal Miller, who 
was in Matamoros, Mexico; Private Edward Lee, who was also in Matamoros, and Sergeant 
George Thomas whose liberty was unauthorized. According to Macklin’s testimony, the United 
States Army should have charge him with violating Articles 15 and 18 of the Articles of War. 
These articles relate to any officer knowingly making false muster and submission of false muster 
reports. There were no attempts on the courts part to request or acquire a copy of a duty log for 
those men who were on duty the day of the raid.64  
The Judge-Advocate then raised the issue of Macklin’s unauthorized absence. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests Macklin was one of the perpetrators shooting in the town. Thus, 
a series of questionable events involving Macklin on the night of the shootings likely implicates 
the captain in the raid. First, Macklin visited the guard mount after 11:00 p.m. that evening before 
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disappearing for the next two and half hours. According to court documents, Macklin ordered the 
trumpeter-of-the-guard to wake him at reveille at 5:00 a.m. This is important to understand, due 
to the fact that if any situation arises at the fort, the trumpeter-of-the-guard must play “call-to-
arms” to alert the soldiers in the fort that they are under attack.  If the trumpeter-of-the-guard is 
busy locating Macklin or performing some other mundane task and the fort comes under attack or 
duress, then there will be no one to notify the soldiers.65
 
Figure 6. An angled shot of Fort Brown in 1906. Major Penrose’s quarters are located in the center  
of this photo. Courtesy of UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives.  
 
The second piece of evidence of Macklin’s involvement concerned reports of pistol shots 
being fired before rifle shots were heard. The citizens of Brownsville, for the most part, were not 
wealthy; therefore, it was very difficult to own a pistol of any kind. Rifles were popular in small 
towns, thus, they were plentiful. Army officers were issued pistols as a side arm along with a 
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saber. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that if the citizens had fired upon Fort Brown that night, 
few would have owned a pistol. There was absolutely no investigation conducted on Macklin’s 
issued pistol which was never considered as evidence.  
Third, there were many soldiers who testified during the court martial that they tried to 
arouse Macklin during the raid. Corporal Ray Burdett, Private Joseph H. Howard, and Private 
Joseph Rogers were initially sent by Major Penrose to locate Captain Macklin and they were 
unsuccessful. Major Penrose then ordered Lt. Grier to send Corporal Madison to find Macklin 
since he was more familiar with the base. Madison stated that when he found Macklin’s saber 
adjacent to the front door of the officer’s barracks he assumed he was inside but after banging on 
the door for a period of time he came to the conclusion that Macklin was not there. “I pounded so 
loudly that it seemed to me that if anyone were in that house downstairs he must have been in a 
trance not to awaken,” he remembered.66
 
Figure 7. On the right of the photo is the Cowen residence where the first shots of the raid landed in 1906. Courtesy 
UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives.  
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Under oath Capt. Macklin stated that he was awakened at 12:55 a.m. on the morning of 
August 14. He rose and listened; however, the knock was not repeated and he heard no one call. 
Determining the significance of the knock is important because it establishes when Macklin was 
awakened. The Judge-Advocate concluded that the knock Macklin initially heard was not Cpl. 
Charles H. Madison. Madison’s attempt was approximately thirty minutes earlier on the morning 
of August 14, 1906 when Lt. Grier ordered him to find Macklin. After Cpl. Madison’s attempt, he 
reported to Maj. Penrose. Penrose ordered him to the far end of Fort Brown to the artillery and 
cavalry post to defend the fort. It would not be until a quarter after 1:00am before Cpl. Madison 
reported to Lt. Grier of his failed attempt to locate Captain Macklin. The knock, Macklin stated 
that he initially heard, could not have been Sgt. Taliaferro. Taliaferro made his attempt before the 
shooting had concluded. Nor could the knock have come from Private Joseph Rogers. Rogers, 
according to Pvt. Samuel Wheeler’s testimony, was one of the three soldiers sent initially after 
the first “call to arms” was sounded, thereby returning while the shootings were in progress. The 
knock, Macklin claimed he heard, according to the Judge-Advocate, was Private Hairston. 
Macklin’s testimony showed that he replied to the knock at his front door at 12:55 a.m. by calling 
out “All right,” which concurred with Private Hairston’s testimony.67
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Figure 8. Private Holloman’s bar that was built by the business men of Brownsville for Black soldiers to 
socialize. Courtesy of UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives.  
The verdict of the Macklin Court-Martial was critically important to the entire 
Brownsville episode. Had Macklin been found “guilty” of negligence while in the service of his 
duty the men of the 25
th
 would have been exonerated. Despite the seriousness of the unauthorized 
absence charges against Macklin the United States Army made no attempts to investigate his 
actual whereabouts during the shooting that night. Major Penrose testified that Macklin 
eventually appeared at 1:20 a.m. on the morning of August 14
th
, an hour and half after the first 
shot was heard. Major Penrose never questioned Captain Macklin’s whereabouts during the 
shooting, nor did he reprimand Macklin afterwards. And despite evidence to the contrary Captain 
Macklin was found not guilty by the Court-Martial Review Board on charges of “neglect of 
duty.”68 If Macklin had been convicted it may have helped exonerate the soldiers. Other officers 
besides Macklin, assigned to Fort Brown, possessed pistols-they were present and accounted for 
during the shooting. None of these officers or their men within the fort fired a single shot, thus, 
no counter claim can be made that perhaps a pistol shot was fired from the fort. Thus, witnesses 
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testified that there was a series of single pistol shots fired from inside the town. In addition to 
Macklin’s absence inside the fort during the entire raid, it is not a farfetched assumption that this 
places him in the town as a participant with the townspeople conducting the raid. Remember, 
Macklin did not take his men seriously when they reported malicious acts against them instigated 
by the townspeople. In fact, Macklin snickered at their misfortunes and made no thorough 
inquires on the numerous matters that were obviously serious. But Macklin was not convicted, 
and no one pursued the possibility of his involvement. His soldiers continue to be blamed.   
 
Figure 9. The 25th Infantry poses for a photo. Courtesy of UT-Brownsville Southmost College Archives. 
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Conclusion: The Case for Restitution  
“Let us consider whether this is a just and politic provision. Whatever may be the fate of the rest of the bill I must 
earnestly pray that this may not be defeated. On its success, in my judgment, depends not only the happiness and 
respectability of the colored race, but their very existence. Homestead to them are far more valuable than the 
immediate right of suffrage, though both are their due.” 
 -Thaddeus Stevens’ speech on the Reparations Bill of 1867 spoken on March 11, 1867  
Although members of the 25
th
 were posthumously given honorable discharges by Richard Nixon 
in 1972, the executive order did not include much in the realm of monetary reparations. Private 
Dorsey Willis, the only surviving soldier, still under dishonorable discharge, received a monetary 
award of $25,000 in 1972. Few of the soldier’s immediate family received $10,000 for their 
heartache and financial hardships over a sixty year period. However, this is not nearly enough 
compensation to equate the injustice that these soldiers endured. The injustice perpetrated by the 
U.S. government suggests that the descendants of the 25
th 
have every right to reparations. Their 
plight is similar to Japanese-Americans and other minorities who suffered government-
sanctioned discrimination. Native Americans who lost their land and suffered from genocidal 
atrocity at the hands of the United States government included Alaskan Natives, who in 1971 
received $1 billion dollars in monetary compensation and an additional $44 million in land 
acreage from the U.S. government and the Klamaths of Oregon who received $81 million dollars 
in monetary compensation in 1980. Five years later, the Lakota tribe of South Dakota, the 
Seminoles of Florida and the Chippewas of Wisconsin were granted a total of $143.3 million 
dollars in compensation. And the very next year in 1986, for the United States’ violation of the 
1836 Treaty, it shelled out $32 million dollars to the Ottawa Indians of Michigan. Four years 
later, in 1990, Japanese-Americans received $1.2 billion dollars in compensation for their 
predicament during World War II.69
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During the United States’ involvement in World War II the government removed 120,000 
Japanese-Americans from their homes and subjected them to American internment camps in the 
Midwest. During this “relocation process many Japanese families lost their homes, their 
possessions, their jobs, and their businesses.70 Approved by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on 
February 8, 1942, Executive Order 9066 forced many Japanese-Americans into poverty. 
Executive Order 9102 on March 20, 1942 enforced the War Relocation Authority, “which 
provided for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal was necessary in the 
interest of national security.” General John L. DeWitt alleged that due to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor by the Japanese, it was likely that over 112,000 Japanese-Americans were apt to assist in 
continued attacks due to ties to their homeland. FDR affirmed DeWitt’s concerns as a military 
necessity.71
  
In Atonement and Forgiveness, historian Al Brooks argues that in Hohri v. United States, 
the plaintiffs sought monetary value for their violated constitutional rights and losses to their 
possessions. Brooks suggests that it was racial prejudice and war hysteria, rather than military 
necessity, that had been the real reasons for the removal and internment of Japanese Americans. 
In the case concerning reparations for African-Americans, Harvard Professor, Leon Friedman 
suggested, “Too many southern officials let their emotions and prejudice sway their decisions in 
only one direction: against the Negro. The result is not isolated injustice or occasional error. An 
entire pattern and practice is established that effectively overrules the law in the statute books or 
the Constitution. A new kind of law owing its allegiance only to the hates and fears of the white 
community governs the day-to-day existence of the…Negro.”   
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African-Americans too have suffered from racism on a massive scale that merit 
reparation. Reparations are not only warranted for the conditions and operations of slavery, but 
for its aftermath. The essence of a Reconstructed South after the Civil War caused vigilantism, 
economic depression, and social division toward newly freed slaves. The effects of Black Codes, 
Jim Crow laws, lynching, and terrorism affected numerous blacks before, during, and after 
Reconstruction. In Race, Racism, and Reparations author J. Angelo Corlett argues that racism is 
motivated by fear that the racist has of the target. Corlett elaborates that racism is normally 
motivated by power that the perpetrator seeks to wield over the target. While arguing this specific 
point, Corlett establishes that there are two factors of racism: ignorance and ideological 
dogmatism. The fact that the United States government lacked the intelligence to better 
understand the African-American beyond public opinion was, as Corlett states, based on 
ignorance. Corlett explains that ideological dogmatism is a racist ideology against African-
Americans, by those who pretended to support them.72 Omari Winbush, attorney, consultant, and 
contributor in the book, Should America Pay?, suggests the United States never intended to grant 
social, political, or economic equality to any African-American. And that the African-American  
suffered from two distinct barriers: skin color and ineffective civil rights legislation dating back 
to Reconstruction. Winbush argues that for too long blacks in America have suffered from 
racism, bigotry, and prejudices primarily from having black skin.73 The only way, according to 
Winbush, to rectify these racial resentments is through recognition of the problem, repentance of 
the evildoing, and conciliatory measures toward the sufferers. Winbush believes reparations will 
accomplish those measures. Tulane University professor, Robert Westley suggests that 
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reparations to Blacks are an obligation of the American government for its role in slavery and the 
violation of Black rights. Westley suggests that the American government’s obligation to the 
restitution on behalf of African-Americans’ plight based on race can be attributed through 
taxpayer funds. Taxpayers, Westley argues, do not have the right to pick and choose government 
expenditures they wish to support. Westley contends that any basis of claim for reparations to the 
descendants of enslaved Africans in America is warranted. Westley further argues that any 
redress from the U.S. government is sufficient. This includes: Sovereignty, land, monetary 
transfers, tax breaks, education scholarships, medical and housing subsidies are all 
proportionately within the federal arsenal. Westley states, that Blacks deserve reparations not 
only because the oppression they face is “systematic, unrelenting, authorized at the highest 
government levels, and practiced by large segments of the population,” but also because they face 
their oppressors as a group, they have never been adequately compensated for their material 
losses due to white racism, and the only possibility of an adequate remedy is group redress.74
 
Westley does not address the Brownsville raid; however, many of his arguments apply to the 
soldiers at Brownsville. As he argues the United States should take into consideration the case of 
the Brownsville soldiers as a group redress on behalf of a grave injustice. Any redress for every 
African-American from every committed injustice over several hundred years seems improbable.   
Many factors contributing to the still unanswered questions continue to haunt 
Brownsville. The affair involved unreliable eyewitness accounts. For example, witness George 
W. Randall testified that he heard the pistol shots as early as ten o’clock the night of the raid; 
while it is commonly known that the shooting did not commence until midnight. T.M. 
McCambell, another citizen, testified that he “saw a whole company shooting,” although 
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government reports account for the involvement of five to twenty men.75 Further, the evidence 
presented by military investigators themselves clearly illustrated that a legal lynching had taken 
place with the dismissal of the 25
th
. During a thorough investigation by the army in 1907 about 
the affair, military experts argued that four of the weapons used that night had been recovered. 
Three of the guns were assigned to members of the 25
th
: Thomas Taylor, Joseph L. Wilson, and 
Ernest English, all privates of Company B. All three testified that they were asleep during the 
raid, heard the call to arms, rushed with their comrades to the gun racks, and were given a gun for 
the entire night, although it was not their assigned weapon. They testified that every man grabbed 
the first rifle they could get during the shooting, thus, their assigned rifles were used by other 
soldiers during the defense of the raid. The fourth gun was not fired at all that night. Rifle 45683 
was originally issued to Sergeant William Blaney of Company B. Prior to the Infantry relocating 
to Brownsville from Nebraska, Blaney went on leave and turned his rifle over to Quartermaster 
Sergeant Walker McCurdy, who placed Blaney’s name on a piece of paper and stored it in the 
butt of the gun. On the night of the shootings Blaney’s gun was stored in an arms chest and was 
never touched. Lt. George C. Lawrason inspected every gun in the gun racks and inspected the 
arms chest which contained Blaney’s rifle. Lawrason was satisfied that all the rifles had been 
accounted for in the gun racks and in the arms chest. Not one rifle was missing, further proving 
that the fourth gun that military officials claimed was used the night of the raid was actually not 
used since it was under bolt and key.76
Throughout the military investigation witnesses stated repeatedly that they saw soldiers 
shooting throughout the town. Although military officials knew that it was common for civilians 
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to wear discarded army uniforms they did not take that into consideration during their 
investigation. Prior to the arrival of the 25
th
, the Third Battalion, a white regiment occupied 
Brownsville. At the beginning months of their duty they threw away many of their worn uniforms 
in favor of their new khaki uniforms. Soon afterward, many of the citizens, especially Mexicans 
were witnessed wearing the Third Battalion’s old uniforms. It is likely that the raiders wore these 
uniforms. In addition the investigators never took seriously the testimony of black soldiers who 
stated that they saw civilians taking guns out of a building directly across the street from the 
barracks around 2:00 p.m. on the afternoon prior to the shootings. For instance Private John Cook 
told Sgt. Walker McCurdy about locals removing weapons. Walker reported this to Major 
Penrose who never documented this incident in the government’s report.77
Along those same lines, two weeks after the raid several black soldiers reported seeing 
civilians around the fort magazine. They found magazine locks broken open, and in the door was 
an iron wedge where an attempt was made to pry it open. Members of the 25
th
 believed that locals 
broke into the magazine and took live rounds and dispersed them on the street near the fort to 
establish their guilt.78 This was also reported to Major Penrose. Many of these investigative 
reports that could have established the clear innocence of the 25
th
 were ignored by government 
officials.  For example, a report conducted by Texas Ranger William McDonald was ignored by 
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“I couldn’t help thinking Macklin must have been out with the coons who were committing 
murder and trying to kill ladies and their children,” McDonald recalled.79  During his 
investigation he told the two officers, “You are sorrier than these niggers…because you, as their 
officers, and as men of the United States Army, ought to be the first to hunt out the guilty ones, 
instead of trying to hide them.”80 Because the Brownsville soldiers were given dishonorable 
discharges, largely on the basis of race, an argument can be made that they were forever unable 
to reap any benefits that befit their mistreatment by the United States government. It can be 
established that these soldiers’ subsequent generation are entitled to their ancestor’s grievances. 
Based upon Brophy’s argument in Reconstructing the Dreamland, the descendants of the 25
th
 
have a strong moral case for reparations. 
 First, there is the unquestioned complicity of both local and federal government. If 
Mayor Combe’s investigating committee had not sent that telegram to the war department the 
Brownsville raid would have been just another incident involving black soldiers and white locals. 
Further, if military investigators would have not assumed the collective guilt of the 25
th
 then 
Roosevelt would not have been able to issue an order based upon their faulty conclusion. Last, 
Roosevelt at any point could have just sent the 25
th
 to another fort instead of dismissing them.  
The second claim for reparations is based upon monetary loss. A lengthy military career 
in many ways put one into middle-class America. Since many other professions were closed to 
black males, especially in the South, military participation was seen as a way to make a living. 
Many black soldiers had served valiantly in the military and they looked forward to the financial 
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awards of retirement. But, when they are dismissed from the army they lost any and all their 
benefits. The dismissal of the 25
th
 and their economic loss conjures up images of economic 
intimidation during “white” hysteria in which black business owners in the Jim Crow south were 
forced to either “sell” their businesses to whites or had their businesses burned to the ground. The 
economic loss to the families of the 25
th
 was a great injustice to those soldiers and their offspring.  
The third and final claim for reparations centers on time and space. According to Brophy, 
reparations for “very specific damage” are what we have in the case of the Brownsville soldiers.  
This is not a case of “general societal discrimination” but rather a case based upon “concentrated 
harm.” Awarding reparations to the descendants of the 25
th
 does not involve the entire African-
American community. Rather, it seeks to award the families of the 167 men who were dismissed. 
In this regard the government-sanctioned racism compares favorably to that of the Japanese 
during World War II and the cases of Native American ethnic groups who received reparations 
for government sponsored and supported discrimination.81
Truly, there is no conclusion to the Brownsville raid. This thesis overall, may further 
debate on Brownsville. Even today, the raid is a sore topic of discussion within social circles in 
Brownsville. Numerous ancestors of those citizens involved in 1906, still, even today, blame the 
Black soldiers. Moreover, this thesis concludes that irresponsibility, brought about at many 
different levels of government, resulted in an American injustice. Now is time to right the wrong.  
                                                 




Figure 10. Pvt. Dorsie Willis receives a check for $25,000 dollars from the United States Army after six decades of 
injustice that imposed poverty on many of the dismissed soldiers. Courtesy of the Associated Press Archives. 
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